Anna Bogacz

NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IN ENGLISH AND POLISH PHRASEOLOGY: A COGNITIVE APPROACH

SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

The language of emotions has been the subject of frequent linguistic study, especially along with the growth of cognitive linguistics' interest in the human conceptualisation of reality and its various linguistic manifestations. Since the beginnings of cognitive linguistocs, a central claim in the works of its proponents (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991 or Fesmire 1994) has been the idea that human emotions, abstract in nature, are to a great extent conceptualised and expressed through metaphor grounded in everyday physical experience. Metaphor, in turn, assumes the shapes of specific linguistic expressions employed by language users to encode and communicate their feelings. Therefore, it seems jusifiable to claim that the analysis of phraseology related to emotions may provide a valuable insight into the structure and contents of emotion concepts in the human mind, as already investigated by, among others, Fehr and Russell (1984), Kövecses (1986), (1988), Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), Wierzbicka (1992a), (1999).

With regard to the conceptualisation of emotions in different languages, there are two major views. The first one (e.g. Ekman 1973, Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989) is that there is a set of universal concepts for basic emotions which are shared by all people. According to the second view (e.g. Wierzbicka 1992a, 1992b), there are no universal concepts for emotions, but rather there exist some universal components of which these concepts are built; however, yet their structure and organisation varies from one language to another. To settle this issue, a large-scale linguistic investigation into the phraseology of emotions in different languages would need to be carried out, in order to show the scale of similarities and differences in the conceptualisation of emotions. Although some comparative studies on emotion concepts have already been pursued (e.g. King 1989; Yu 1995, 1998; Matsuki 1995; Mikołajczuk 1998, 2003), still, most attention in the linguistic research has been centred on the emotion concepts in English (e.g. Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, Kövecses 1986, Lakoff 1987).

This work, titled *Negative emotions in English and Polish phraseology: a cognitive approach* aims to provide a confrontative analysis of phraseological items linked to selected concepts

form the macrocategory **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** in English and Polish, with the guidance of the cognitive methodological framework, and, in particular, the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy. The main goal set by the author of this thesis is to work out some general conceptual (metaphorical and metonymic) schemata on the basis of the analysis of collected phraseological resources. Moreover, the author aims to see how such concepts as ANGER, FEAR and SADNESS are conceptualised in English and Polish, as well as to determine whether one can speak of universality or, rather, specificity of such constructions.

This work has been divided into five chapters, of which the first four provide the theoretical background for the final, analytical part. *Chapter 1: The main aspects of phraseological analysis* offers an overview of various problems related to the concept of phraseology. It has been noticed there that the central term – *phraseology* – is employed in linguistics in two meanings, i.e. (1) the expressions and word combinations in a natural language, style or a corpus of texts, and (2) a branch of lexicology that records and studies the expressions and word combinations in a language. In conteporary English-language linguistics the most commonly used counterparts of the Polish term *frazeologia* are: *phraseology, idiomatology* and *idiomatics*. To specify what belongs to its sphere of interest is not obvious, as determining what criteria must be met by a word combination to make it possible to be classifies as *a phraseological unit* is one of the most controversial issues in phraseology and forms a ground for a diversification of numerous phraseological schools of thought existing in contemporary linguistics. Among the criteria that differ phraseological expressions from other word combinations (called *free word-groups*) there are, among others, any irregularity (lexical, semantic, syntactic, etc.) observed in a particular combination of words (Lewicki and Pajdzińska 1993), a consolidation of such a word combination in a language (Antrushina *et al.* 1985, Polański 1993), as well as a degree of consolidation of the words making up the group.

In the tradition of European and non-European linguistic study a wider interest in phraseology spread around the mid-20th century. Earlier, this field of study had been developing in Russia – the studies of such linguists as V.V. Vinogradov, N.N. Amosova, I. Melčuk, or A.V. Kunin resulted in separating and a detailed description of a *phraseological unit* (orig. *фразеологическая единица*) – the most widely employed umbrella term in Russian phraseology and the central subject of all phraseological studies, as well as in several soundly-based classifications of this type of items. They soon built up a reputation of classic theories, which became influential in many later studies on phraseology, as well as unrivalled in their application to the design and compilation of dictionaries (Cowie 1998). In Poland the first

major studies in this field that may be said to have laid foundations of Polish theoretical phraseology, were by S. Skorupka (1950, 1952, 1960, 1965) and W. Doroszewski (1954, 1958-69), who worked out the scientific definition of *phraseology* and its rudimentary terminology, and, perhaps most importantly, the semantic and formal classification of phraseological units, which in the years to come found application in many later works concerning lexicography, lexicology and stylistics. More recently, some of the most influential research tasks in this field have been those undertaken by, among others: S. Bąba (phraseological innovations, phraseological correctness), A.M. Lewicki (theory of syntactic phraseology), A. Bogusławski, W. Chlebda (pragmatic phraseology, phrasematics), A. Pajdzińska (phraseology and poetry, pragmatic phraseology) or J. Bartmiński (etnocognitive phraseology). At present, among the most popular phraseological issues there are: confrontative research (from synchronic and diachronic perspective) and methodology of phraseology.

Another problem discussed in this chapter is the relevant phraseological terminology. In short, a term of the widest use as a general name for the structures being the subject of the phraseological study is the label *idiom* in English, and *związek frazeologiczny / frazeologizm* (*'phraseological unit / phraseologism'*) in Polish. The generally accepted fact is that *idiom / phraseologism* is a structure whose meaning cannot be inferred from the lexical meaning of its constitutive elements (e.g. Eng. *black sheep,* Pol. *czarna owca* 'a person regarded by others as a failure or embarrassment'), as opposed to the aforementioned *free word-group* in which each of the constituents preserves its individual meaning (e.g. Eng. *black dog*, Pol. *czarny pies*). In order to distinguish idioms from free word-groups one may follow the semantic and structural criteria (Antrushina *et al.* 1985) as well as a degree of structural, denotative and social consolidation of a word group (Lewicki 1995), or conventionality, figurativeness, informality and effect (Kavka 2003). Among other aspects that are frequently pointed out there are: a subject of untranslability of many existing phraseologisms or including into the scope of phraseology such constructions as phrasal verbs, comparisons etc.

The first comprehensive classification in the history of phraseological study, widely accepted adopted by linguists working on different languages, was developed by Vinogradov (1947). His typology is based on the *semantic principle* (the degree of semantic cohesion between the components of a phraseological unit), and consists in the tripartition of such structures, i.e. (1) phraseological combinations (word-groups with clear motivation, whose meaning can be easily deduced from the meanings of its constituents), (2) phraseological unities (word-groups whose meanings are deducible through the metaphor on which the shift of meaning is based),

and (3) phraseological fusions – utterly non-motivated (at least synchronically) word-groups whose meaning cannot be inferred from the constituent parts. On Polish grounds, the "classic" typology of phraseologisms is the formalo-semantic classification authored by Skorupka (1950, 1952), who distinguished three classes of phraseologisms, that is: (1) *związki frazeologiczne / wyrazowe stałe* 'fixed phraseological units', (2) *związki frazeologiczne / wyrazowe łączliwe* 'collocative phraseological units', and (3) *związki frazeologiczne / wyrazowe luźne* 'free word-groups'. The classification of phraseological expressions based on the semantic principle does not result in a very sharp and clear-cut division – some expressions initially classified as *free* or *collocational* may with time turn into *fixed,* or the same expression may be either *fixed* or *free,* depending on the context. The other major part of Skorupka's (1950) classification of phraseological units is based on formal criteria and focuses on grammatical character of the lexical items which constitute a given phraseological expression and on the type of syntactic relationship between them. Hence, the following types are distinguished: (1) *wyrażenie*, that may be equalled to the English term *nominal phrase,* (2) *zwrot*, that may be equalled to the English term *verb phrase / expression*, and (3) *fraza,* that may be equalled to the English term *clause*. In addition, Skorupka (1950) particularised certain subtypes in each of the distinguished classes, i.e. *series expressions*, *comparative expressions*, *figurative expressions* and *rhyming expressions.* In the 1980s Lewicki (1983) authored another typology of phraseological units, in which they became divided into Pol. *jednostki znakowe gramatycznie kompletne* 'grammatically complete semantic units' and Pol. *jednostki znakowe fragmentaryczne* 'fragmentary semantic units' (including verbal phrases, expressions and phraseological markers.

Another topic tackled in this chapter is a function of phraseological units in a natural language. Here, the following functions have been distinguished: supplementing the word-stock of a language, increasing the clarity, vividness and expressiveness of a text, introducing elements of humour etc.

As well as the extralinguistic motivation for phraseological units is concerned, it may be said to be either natural or conventional. Among the main sources of idiomatic expressions there are: human work and activities, the Bible, mythology, ancient literature and history, classic European and world literature, literature of a given speech community. By all means, the rise of phraseological units has been based on the observation of the mimic, gestures and behaviour of people and animals. In yet another view, three types of motivation have been distinguished: categorial-grammatical, lexical and global (Lewicki 1982), as well as

verbalisation of abstract nouns and derivation of one phraseological unit from another being main sources of phraseological units (Mlacek 1980).

The next issue undertaken in *Chapter 1* is the problem of translability of phraseological units. In this respect – among other aspects – the degrees of equivalence involved in translating phraseological units (Gläser 1984) are discussed, i.e.:

1) complete equivalence – a congruence or identity of the denotational, connotational, expressive and stylistic meanings,
2) partial equivalence – when idioms differ considerably in their referential base of a metaphor or metonymy, their connotational and stylistic meanings,
3) zero equivalence – when there is no approximate expression in a target language.

Finally, the chapter devoted to phraseology includes an overview of selected phraseological dictionaries in English (e.g. Cowie and Mackin 1975) and Polish (e.g. Skorupka 1967-68, Bąba *et al.* 1992, 1995, 2001), and an attempt of listing the most important challenges and tasks in the contemporary phraseological lexicography.

Chapter 2, titled *On the interdependence of language, culture and emotions* starts with presenting a thesis that every language is a reflection and extension of a certain outlook on the world shared by a given linguistic community. Therefore, language might be seen as a crucial mechanism contributing to both the formation and reinforcement of a cultural identity.

The author points to the work of Teliya *et al.* (1998), distinguishing five major channels through which language is penetrated by culture:

1) cultural semes – words and word-combinations that denote idioethnic realia,
2) cultural concepts – abstract notions that map and construct the world-picture in a culturally specific way,
3) cultural connotations – interpretative relations between linguistic signs and symbols of any other cultural non-verbal code – stereotypes, myths, etc.
4) cultural background – ideological aura associated with a historical situation, a political movement, a fashionable trend etc.
5) discourse stereotypes.

One of the key issues connecting language with emotions is the understanding of the term *emotion.* Among numerous views on this subject, an interesting proposal of a comprehensive definition of *emotion* is that of by Kleigninna and Kleigninna (1981), who analysed ninety-two different definitions of *emotion* found in the literature on the subject and proposed

their own model definition which aimed to emphasise the many possible and traditionally significant aspects of emotion – e.g. affective, cognitive, psychological, expressive, etc.

Another topic is the one of expressing emotions by means of language. It has been noticed that there is generally agreed that emotions are neither definable nor fully possible to be expressed in words, just as experiences and emotional cognition. Another difficulty is posed by the fact that emotions may arise from a purely subjective interpretation, and – as a result – different emotions may have the same name, or the other way round: the same emotion may be called different names. Apparently, even more serious problems arise when attempting to render emotion words from one language into another. In fact, one can never be sure whether it is right to say that an emotion word in one language and its counterpart in another one are in fact equivalents. A solution to this problem, suggested by Wierzbicka (1992a), is to describe emotions without using "emotion" words. Instead, a given emotion term should be decomposed into simpler concepts – elementary values (in author's terminology *semantic primitives*), such as "want", "feel", "think", "say", or "do". In this way, emotion terms from a particular language may become meaningful to speakers of other languages.

The linguistic interest in the world of emotions is to a large extent focused on cognitive analyses of figurative expressions grounded in metaphor and metonymy (e.g. Baxter 1992, Duck 1994, Holland and Kipnis 1995, Niemeier and Dirven 1997; Athanasiadou and Tabakowska 1998, Kövecses 1990, 2000). Many of them are based on the theory that language that we use is rooted in metaphor, and the analysis of its lexical layer makes it possible to discover and formalise the scenarios of mental experiences that underlay their lexical signs, i.e. the emotion models which are associated with particular lexemes in human minds. In an attempt to characterise this emotional meaning one may distinguish two most prominent solutions: the *prototype view*, related to basic-level categories (e.g. Fehr and Russell 1984, Wierzbicka 1992a, 1999; Lakoff and Kövecses 1987; Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990), and the *social constructionist view* (e.g. Lutz 1988).

Leaving out terminological details, it must be said that emotions have been subject to a large number of typological schemes, which take into consideration their different features and classificatory criteria, and revolve around various approaches to this problem in general. Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989), having collected emotion words listed in various lexicographic works, arrived at the total number of 590 items. In an attempt to get to grips with this mass of words and underlying emotions, a number of taxonomies have been proposed, e.g. cognitive vs. non-cognitive, higher vs. lower, simple vs. complex, positive vs.

negative emotions. Both philosophers and psychologists have long been trying to distinguish between central and more marginal emotion terms, and thus set up a system of basic emotions, which is visualized in the table below:

BASIC EMOTIONS						
Descartes (1649)	**Ribot (1912)**	**Watson (1924)**	**Plutchik (1980)**	**Ekman *et al.* (1982)**	**Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1987)**	**Goleman (1995)**
1.admiration 2. love 3. hatred 4. desire 5. joy 6. sadness	1. fear 2. anger 3. love 4. sexual feelings 5. egoistic feelings	1. fear 2. anger 3. love	1. joy 2. sadness 3. anger 4. fear 5. trust 6. disgust 7. surprise 8. anticipation	1. anger 2. disgust 3. fear 4. joy 5. sadness 6. surprise	1. anger 2. disgust 3. anxiety 4. happiness 5. sadness	1. anger 2. sadness 3. fear 4. enjoyment 5. love 6. surprise 7. disgust 8. shame

Comparing the classifications presented above with each other, as well as a number of other typologies proposed elsewhere, there appear to be seven common core emotions considered to be biologically-conditioned and common for all people, regardless of their ethnic background or cultural differences. These emotions are: HAPPINESS, SURPRISE, SADNESS, ANGER, DISGUST, CONTEMPT and FEAR (Beck 2004). However, there have been some opposite views as well, either rejecting the concept of basic emotions whatsoever (Ortony *et al.* 1988) or claiming that it should by no means be assumed that any emotions are universal, because they are strictly linked to culture and, therefore, different in different languages (Wierzbicka 1992a).

In the summary of this part of the thesis, it has been stated that the approach that seems to offer the greatest level of compliance with the need for an interdisciplinary outlook on the issue of emotions is the cognitive framework, as it draws upon the findings of psychological, anthropological and philosophical research. The research on the conceptualization of emotions in different languages, focusing e.g. on the tendencies in the use of metaphors and metonymies in the language of emotions, provide better and better knowledge of structuring emotion concepts in different languages. The greatest challenge in this field of research seems to be establishing whether there are any cultural (social, economic, political etc.) conditions

that may influence the relevant changes in the conceptualisation of emotions, and whether it is possible to point to any regularities or tendencies that would govern these changes.

Chapter 3, titled *Cognitive linguistics as a framework for phraseological research* aims to provide an outline of basic assumptions of cognitive linguistics, adopted as the methodological framework of the analysis of selected phraseological units in the practical part of this thesis. The roots of cognitive linguistics date back to the 1970s, when this paradigm arose as a consequence of dissatisfaction with Noam Chomsky's generative grammar and failed attempts to extend this theory into the realm of semantics. Among the pioneers of cognitive linguistics one must mention Ch. Fillmore and R. Langacker, and among the most influential works of the early cognitive thought there are: *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar* (Langacker 1987-91), *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (Lakoff 1987). Generally speaking, the main interest of cognitive linguistics may be divided into two main areas, i.e.: cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar. The former is primarily concerned with investigating the relationship between experience, the conceptual system and the semantic structure encoded by language. In the cognitive approach, meaning is perceived as a way of shaping the world – it is dynamic and flexible, as a result of which language is not a stable structure. Moreover, in the cognitive view meaning is experientially grounded and, as a consequence, language does not directly reflect the world, but rather reflects our unique human construal of the world which is subjective and experience-dependent. It is then believed that we can only talk about what we can perceive and conceive, and these things and phenomena derive from our embodied experience. The other area of interest of cognitive linguistics, i.e. *cognitive grammar,* is preliminary concerned with the level of language use (*parole* in the terms of Ferdinand de Saussure), which in this view dominates over *langue.* Apart from these two areas of interest, the contemporary cognitive scene comprises formally-biased studies (e.g. Jackendoff 1983, 1987, Langacker 1987), studies with philosophical tinge (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987), works from the borders of literary and linguistic analysis (Turner 1987, Lakoff and Turner 1989) and others.

For the purposes formulated in this work, the key area of study and achievement of cognitive linguistics is the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy. According to cognitive linguists, metaphor is not a purely linguistic figure, but it is a part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualising the world, and it is present not only in poetry (as classical theories claimed), but it may be seen in all spheres of linguistic expression and

communication. In the cognitive view, the mechanism of metaphorisation is considered to be form the basis of thinking, and the metaphor itself is its more or less conventionalised expression. In the simplest terms, metaphor is held to be a phenomenon which provides a link between two domains of knowledge – a source domain and a target domain. The model of two domains is based on two assumptions: first, understanding one domain in terms of another is a basic cognitive mechanism of human mind, and, second, the process of metaphorisation is grounded in experience. Our conceptualisation of reality is to a large extent conditioned by the nature and physiology of human body and the interaction with its surrounding (Johnson 1987), which may explain the existence of the same or similar conceptual metaphors in different, even unrelated languages.

Considering cognitive functions of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) distinguish its three types, i.e.:

(1) *structural metaphors* – enable speakers to understand target domain by means of the structure of source domain (e.g. <LIFE IS A JOURNEY>, <THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS>);
(2) *ontological metaphors* – they give an ontological status to general categories of abstract target concepts (e.g. <THE MIND IS A MACHINE>, <THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT>);
(3) *orientational metaphors* – they mostly have to do with basic human spatial orientations (e.g. <HAPPY IS UP>, <SAD IS DOWN>).

Kövecses (2002, 2005) classifies metaphors according to: the degree of conventionality, the cognitive function, nature (based on knowledge or image) and the level of generality.

One of the most significant contemporary theoretical extensions and refinements of the conceptual theory of metaphor is the *blending theory* (Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 1996, 1998, 2002), which involves four spaces. Two of them, i.e. *the input spaces*, correspond to source and target domains, the third is the *blended space*, which represents the interaction of the input spaces (in the blended space the knowledge of source and target inputs combines into a coherent structure which is temporarily activated in a language user's mind), and the fourth space is the *generic space*, which contains the schematic material shared by the two input spaces. The application of the blending theory enables – among others – to explain the way in which metaphorical structures are created spontaneously in a discourse, while the standard theory tends to focus on more conventional language, fixed expressions, idioms and proverbs. Finally, the conceptual integration mechanism is not restricted to the analysis of metaphor – it may well be treated as a general procedure in human cognition.

In the conceptual theory of metonymy it is argued that similarly to metaphor, metonymy is not purely linguistic in nature, but it is a conceptual mechanism operating in embodied mind, and it is grounded in culture. In the simplest terms possible, metonymy may be defined as such an association of two entities in which one entity stands for the other. The possibility of using two concepts in this way results from the fact that they are associated with each other in our experience (they "belong together"). Among the most typical and frequently analysed examples of metaphor there are: <PART FOR WHOLE>, <WHOLE FOR PART>, <PLACE FOR INSTITUTION>, <CAUSE FOR EFFECT>. To account for the working of the mechanism of metonymy and to provide its definition, the conceptual constructs such as *frames, conceptual domains, Idealised Cognitive Models, schemas* and *mappings* are typically used.

As for the differences between metonymy and metaphor, it may be said that while the main function of metaphor is to provide understanding, the primary function of metonymy is that of reference. Moreover, metaphor is supposed to be based on similarity (a paradigmatic relation holding between entities across different domains of experience), while metonymy – on contiguity (a syntagmatic relation connecting entities in the same chunk of experience). Similarity is justifiably considered to be a subjective relation, while entities connected by the relation of contiguity usually interact or may be perceived to interact in an objective sense. Due to the fact that sometimes it may be difficult to distinguish between similarity and contiguity, Gibbs (1999:62) proposes an "is like" test. Because only metaphorical expressions paraphrased with the use of the "is like" result in meaningful utterances, it provides the means of determining whether a given expression is metaphorical or metonymic..

The cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy is frequently exploited in contemporary research on phraseology. In the cognitive approach to the analysis of phraseological expressions, the lexical layer of an idiom is used as a means to retrace a conceptual metaphor or metonymy that motivate it, which, in turn, enables to reach the cognitive structure of concepts functioning in the human mind.

Chapter 4, titled *Purposes and methodology*, aims to give an account of the methodology applied in the research undertaken in this thesis, the assumed goals and expected results. Firstly, it lists the sources of lingustic data used in the analytical part of this thesis (a detailed list of all sources is included in *Bibliography*), i.e.:

1) phraseological, thematic and general dictionaries (monolingual and bilingual),
2) English and Polish language corpora,
3) linguistic literature (works devoted to the phraseology of emotions),

4) suggestions of native speakers of English and Polish.

The quest for phraseological expressions related to the category **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** resulted in a collection of several thousand items, which have been examined for their accordance with basic indicators of idomaticity as well as for involving metaphor or metonymy as a source of their motivation. It turned out the same conceptual patterns are reproduced in a number of idioms, so it was possible to group the idioms under a number of "headings" (e.g. <ANGER IS FIRE>, <AN ANGRY PERSON IS A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL>, <SWEAT STANDS FOR FEAR>, <SADNESS IS PHYSICAL PAIN>, etc.). Next, the English and Polish idioms that seemed to represent the same conceptual entailments were collated in order to establish links of equivalence between them, and, finally, to find out which expressions do not have their counterparts in the other language.

Chapter 5, titled *The working of conceptual metaphors and metonymies in English and Polish phraseology related to the macrocategory **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS*** includes the results of the analysis carried out for the purpose of this thesis. They have been demonstrated in confrontative tables, separate for each conceptual metaphorical or metonymic pattern, thanks to which a number of observations – crucial in terms of the goals set to this work – can be made, concerning, for example, the dominance of either metaphor or metonymy in the conceptualisation of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS**, similarities and differences existing in the English and Polish language of emotions, etc. Each table is followed by analytical considerations intended – among others – to trace and describe more specific conceptual entailments within general metaphorical / metonymic patterns, lexical explanations of certain idioms, their etymology, cultural background, restrictions of use, etc. Moreover, each subsection devoted to a particular emotion includes a presentation of the lexical field in question and some psychological background to a given emotion concept.

One of the tangible findings of this research from a cognitive point of view is the formulation of a set of conceptual schemata. Some of them (e.g. <ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER> or <ANGER IS FIRE>) had been formulated earlier in the literature on the subject (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Kövecses 1986, Mikołajczuk 2003); however, some have been formulated on the basis of the analysis carried out in this work (e.g. <AN ANGRY PERSON IS A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL>, <A FRIGHTENED PERSON IS A FRIGHTENED ANIMAL>, <FEAR IS DEATH>). An overview of the main metaphorical and metonymic patterns that emerge from this analysis is presented in the tables below.

a) metaphorical patterns

	Total number of idioms	English	Polish
ANGER			
<ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER>	**60**	33	27
<AN ANGRY PERSON IS A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL>	**43**	29	14
<ANGER IS FIRE>	**36**	17	19
<ANGER IS A PHYSICAL IRRITATION>	**19**	11	8
FEAR			
<A FRIGHTENED PERSON IS A FRIGHTENED ANIMAL>	**14**	10	4
<FEAR IS DEATH>	**11**	6	5
<FEAR IS INSANITY>	**10**	7	3
<FEAR IS COLD>	**9**	4	5
SADNESS			
<SADNESS IS A PHYSICAL PAIN / SUFFERING / BURDEN>	**20**	9	11
<SAD IS DOWN>	**18**	12	6
<SADNESS IS A HEART CONDITION>	**12**	8	4
<SADNESS IS A PSYCHIC CONDITION>	**11**	1	10

Looking at all analysed phraseologisms collectively, the most frequently operative metaphorical pattern turns out to be – to phrase it in most general terms – <A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL>. Its validity has been confirmed in the conceptualisation of all emotions scrutinised in this thesis, and the abundance of idiomatic expressions that comply with this pattern (a total of 66 examples, excluding variants) may serve as a confirmation of the frequently formulated hypothesis that animal metaphor (zoosemy) is a vital part of both human

conceptualisation of the world and the language used to express it. A high place in the conceptualisation of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** is occupied by the experience of human life and death (see e.g. <FEAR IS DEATH>, <SADNESS IS DEATH>, <ANGER IS A PHYSICAL CONDITION / ILLNESS>), and, in particular, certain disturbances in the functioning of both the human body and mind (see e.g. <FEAR IS INSANITY>, <SADNESS IS A HEART CONDITION>, <SADNESS IS A PSYCHIC CONDITION>).

b) metonymic patterns

	Total number of idioms	English	Polish
ANGER			
<VIOLENT ACTIONS (ALSO IN SPEECH) STAND FOR ANGER>	**13**	5	8
<A CHANGE IN FACE COLOUR STANDS FOR ANGER>	**10**	4	6
<OVERALL INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AGITATION STANDS FOR ANGER>	**10**	4	6
<A FACIAL EXPRESSION STANDS FOR ANGER>	**7**	2	5
FEAR			
<A DROP IN THE BODY TEMPERATURE STANDS FOR FEAR>	**31**	16	15
<A DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF ONE'S HEART STANDS FOR FEAR>	**10**	2	8
<A DISRUPTION OF SPEECH STANDS FOR FEAR>	**9**	2	7
<A CHANGE IN FACE COLOUR STANDS FOR FEAR>	**9**	7	2
SADNESS			
<CRYING STANDS FOR SADNESS>	**43**	17	26
<A DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF ONE'S HEART STANDS FOR FEAR>	**12**	2	10
<A FACIAL EXPRESSION STANDS FOR SADNESS>	**12**	4	8

An overview of all metonymies found in the conceptualisation of the analysed **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** clearly shows that each and every one of them is grounded in human bodily experience. All of the metonymic entailments discussed here are may be said to represent a general metonymic schema <A PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF AN EMOTION STANDS FOR THE EMOTION>. Its prevalence in the analysed linguistic data proves again that the language we speak is indeed deeply rooted in our everyday and bodily experience.

All in all, it may be concluded that a dominating role in the conceptualisation of ANGER, FEAR and SADNESS is played by such domains as **HUMAN BODY, HUMAN MIND** and **ANIMALS.** If further research into the phraseology of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** – which exceeds the scope and purpose of this thesis – were to bring similar results, the conclusion formulated above could be extended for the whole domain **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS**, or, possibly, even **EMOTIONS** in general.

When it comes to the problem of the dominance of either metaphor or metonymy in the conceptualisation of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS**, the following proportions of their existence in the analysed phraseological data have been observed:

	Number of conceptual schemata classified as:		**Number of idioms based on:**	
	metaphor	**metonymy**	**metaphor**	**metonymy**
ANGER	12	9	236	54
FEAR	4	12	44	98
SADNESS	10	3	101	67
Total:	**23**	**24**	**381**	**219**

As the above table shows, in the conceptualisation of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** there appears to be no recurrence or regularity in the dominance of either metaphor or metonymy. The total numbers of metaphorical and metonymic patterns are comparable (23 metaphor and 24 metonymies); however, the number of individual expressions grounded in metaphor nearly

doubles those based on metonymy. Therefore, it may be concluded that metaphor is a more productive conceptual mechanism and dominates over metonymy in the conceptualisation of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS.**

The next analysed aspect of the analysis undertaken in this thesis is to find out which metaphorical and metonymic patterns operative in the macrocategory **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** function simultaneously in English and Polish, and which – on the other hand – appear in only one of these languages. It has been discovered that apart from two examples (scarcely exemplified), all of the metaphorical and metonymic entailments discussed here are present in both languages. There are more differences as for the numbers of individual expressions in both languages - among the 605 English and Polish idioms quoted in this thesis, 264 (that is 44%) have been classified as either complete or approximate equivalents, 189 (31%) have been found only in the English language, and 152 (25%) appear to be characteristic of Polish. This may be interpreted as clear evidence that in the English and Polish languages the conceptualisation of certain phenomena (in this case, selected **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS**) is comparable on the level of general metaphorical and metonymic patterns, but in the specific realisations of these patterns (i.e. on the level of individual idiomatic expressions) it is far more language-specific. Furthermore, it may be said that in both language communities there exists a common perception of the world, which has been proved by the common functioning of the majority of conceptual schemata. On the other hand, the differences in phraseology, on its lexical or grammatical level, as well as in references to various historical or social facts, etc., prove that each language is in fact a unique phenomenon, very often inexpressible by means of another tongue.

Finally, it must be said that there are many relevant questions that either remain untouched or only partially answered in this thesis. An interesting further step forward could be to make an attempt and carry out in-depth analyses of the phraseology of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** in other natural languages, which would provide a broader perspective on the conceptualisation of **NEGATIVE EMOTIONS** in different languages. Furthermore, the linguistic data obtained in this way could be exploited to examine the cultures of various language communities (English, Polish and other), and to find out to what extent and how the various differences existing between cultures are manifested in their languages. This, however, exceeds the scope of purely linguistic investigation, and would require a deeper sociological and anthropological angle.