UNIWERSYTET RZESZOWSKI

INSTYTUT FILOLOGII ANGIELSKIEJ

A STUDY OF *ATTRIBUTIVE ETHNONYMS* IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO *FOODSEMY*

STUDIUM *ETNONIMÓW ATRYBUTYWNYCH* W HISTORII JĘZYKA ANGIELSKIEGO ZE SZCZEGÓLNYM UWZGLĘDNIENIEM MECHANIZMU *POKARMOSEMII*

MARCIN KUDŁA

ROZPRAWA DOKTORSKA

napisana pod kierunkiem

PROF. DR HAB. PAVLA ŠTEKAUERA

RZESZÓW 2015

SUMMARY

It is beyond doubt that **categorisation** is a process which **is as natural and fundamental for the proper functioning of the human mind as breathing and eating are for the proper functioning of the human body**. As a matter of fact, the omnipresence of categorisation in our lives may be one of the reasons why we normally take it for granted, rarely reflecting upon its nature. It is hardly possible to overrate the significance of categorisation for the phenomenon of **ethnicity**, which is one of the basic dimensions along which we perceive and introduce order into our environment. Therefore, categorisation is the starting point of the present thesis. In particular, it constitutes the major theme of the first chapter, whose main aim is to show **stereotypes** as products of categorisation.

Evidently, the classical view of categorisation, which had dominated linguistic thought since the times of Aristotle to the latter half of the twentieth century, has proven unable to capture the intricacies of the problem. The view of categories as containers with clear-cut boundaries, defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, worked well in some cases, yet ignored a large portion of linguistic data. The breakthrough came with *Second Generation Cognitive Science* (Sinha 2007:1266). Research carried out by American anthropologists and psychologists, such as Berlin and Kay (1969), Rosch (1975; 1978), Rosch and Mervis (1975), Rosch *et al*. (1978), etc., resulted in the development of the notion of **prototype**, which allowed for a better understanding of processes connected to categorisation. The results of experiments suggest that in many cases one can identify an easily noticeable centre and ill-defined periphery.[1] In other words, category boundaries are often **fuzzy**, which may lead difficulties in classifying particular cases. To give an example, despite the fact that – technically speaking – the tomato is a fruit, in Poland it is usually perceived as a vegetable.[2]

Another conclusion drawn from the above-mentioned experiments is that in many cases defining a category in terms of its **essential features** distorts its picture. A good example is the category BIRD, analysed among others by Rosch (1975). In particular, both the sparrow and penguin (a prototypical and peripheral member of the category, respectively) are warm-blooded, have a beak, feathers, pneumatic bones, etc. What differentiates between them (besides size and colour) is the ability to fly in the former and the ability to swim in the latter. Neither of these features is essential for the category BIRD, yet an average language-user

[1] See Berlin and Kay (1969), Heider (1971, 1972), Rosch (1975).

[2] This can be seen in the culinary habits of Poles and in the placement of tomatoes in supermarkets and greengrocer's.

would have no difficulty stating which of them is characteristic of birds. What is more, the ability to fly, which is an **additional attribute**, in most cases allows one to identify a bird much better than the presence of pneumatic bones, which is an essential feature. Thus, although describing categories in terms of essential features may be of analytic value, it does not reflect our perception, which has a holistic nature.[3] In other words, we perceive objects as **gestalts**, rather than as bundles of attributes.[4]

It is worth asking at this juncture how it is possible that categories do not fall apart, if we reject the idea that they are defined by essential features. The answer to this question is in the notion of **family resemblances**, which cognitive psychologists and linguists[5] have borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953[1978]). The Austrian philosopher argues – with the use of the lexical item *game* (*Spiel*) – that there need not be a set of features common to all members of a given category, or – more precisely – that even if such a set can be collected it may not be sufficient to differentiate this category from others. Various attributes, in turn, may be present in many, albeit not in all members of a particular category (similarly to a real family).

Another significant conclusion which follows from the research on the perception of categories is that categories differ in their level of generality. Importantly, the intermediate level, known as **basic** or **generic** level plays a crucial role in categorisation.[6] In short, the experiments described in Rosch *et al*. (1976) suggest that this level highlights intercategory differences and intracategory similarities best.

While the notion of prototype has not provided the answers to all questions concerning categorisation, it has proved extremely inspirational for the linguistic thought of the end of the twentieth century. Specifically, it greatly contributed to the development of **Cognitive Linguistics** in the 1980s.[7] A good example of the application of the above-mentioned findingd is George Lakoff's (1987) theory of **idealised cognitive models** (ICMs).[8] According to Lakoff (1987:45), prototype effects are a side-effect of the internal category structure,

[3] See Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1987), Taylor (1992), Ungerer and Schmid (1996), etc.

[4] The notion of *gestalt* was originally developed by gestalt psychologists, notably Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Köhler, who established the Berlin School of Experimental Psychology in the 1930s (see, for example, Wertheimer 1924[1938] and Koffka 1935).

[5] See Rosch and Mervis (1975), Geeraerts (2010), Taylor (1992), etc.

[6] See D'Andrade (1995).

[7] See Langacker (1987), Lakoff (1987), etc.

[8] See section 1.2.2.2.

rather than its determinant. It can surface for instance when a particular category is a cluster model, which is psychologically more basic than the individual models. An example of a cluster model would be the concept MOTHER. According to Lakoff (1987:74-76), this concept comprises a number of models, each of which provides a slightly different definition of the word *mother*. These are:

1. the BIRTH model: 'the person who gives birth to a child';
2. the GENETIC model: 'the female who contributes genetic material to a child';
3. the NURTURANCE model: 'the female adult who nurtures and raises a child';
4. the MARITAL model: 'the wife of the father';
5. the GENEALOGICAL model: 'the closest female ancestor of a child';

Typically, all models combine to form a cluster model of the concept MOTHER. However, terms like *stepmother, biological mother* or *surrogate mother* demonstrate that this is not always the case. Prototype effects may also surface when one subcategory comes to stand for the whole category – such a model is described as **metonymic**. An example given by Lakoff (1987:79-82) is that of the stereotype of HOUSEWIFE, which is seen as a subcategory of MOTHER. Lakoff argues that in our culture (probably more so in the U.S.A. than in Europe, and probably more in the late 1980s than at the beginning of the twenty-first century) housewife mothers are perceived as better examples of mothers than nonhousewife-mothers, another subcategory. It is the HOUSEWIFE model, in which a married woman does not work and instead takes care of the house and children, that defines cultural expectations concerning a 'typical' mother. As we shall see, both of these types of ICM are significant in the context of the present thesis

It needs to be stated that the importance of metonymy in Cognitive Linguistics reaches far beyond the issue of categorisation. Together with metaphor (which also frequently influences the shape of a category), it is seen as a basic cognitive mechanism, rather than a stylistic device.[9] Following the publication of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) ground-breaking work *Metaphors We Live By*, research into these two phenomena (especially metaphor) constitutes one of the leitmotifs of Cognitive Linguistics. Starting from the mid 1990s, this

[9] See section 1.2.3.

research became known as **Conceptual Metaphor Theory** (CMT).[10] The major tenets of CMT may be summarised in a number of general statements (see Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Lakoff 1993, Kövecses 2002, Geeraerts 2010, Evans and Green 2006, Kardela 2006, Grady 2007, etc.). Firstly, both metaphor and metonymy are seen as a property of **thought** first of all, rather than language. Indeed, it is argued that they are **cognitive instruments** which play a major role in the process of comprehension of abstract concepts. The phenomena in question, in turn, are grounded in our experience, which is **embodied**. This does not mean, of course, that there are no differences between metaphor and metonymy. Traditionally, the two were defined in terms of similarity and contiguity, respectively,[11] yet according to cognitive linguists these terms do not capture their nature well enough. Instead, from the cognitive point of view metaphor may be seen as a process in which some elements of the **source domain** are mapped onto the **target domain**.[12] Importantly, the process of mapping is unidirectional and proceeds from a domain which is closer to our experience to a domain which is more abstract (Grady 2007:191). It needs to be stressed that in metaphor the source domain and the target domain belong to different domain matrices,[13] or ICMs,[14] which distinguishes it from metonymy, in which both domains belong to the same matrix, or ICM. More specifically, in metonymy a **vehicle** stands for (that is, provides mental access to) a **target**[15] within the same ICM.

Admittedly, Lakoff's (1987) ICM is not the only theoretical construct developed by cognitive linguists with the aim of describing the way we categorise our experience. However, it is largely congruent with the theoretical developments of other cognitive linguists, such as Charles Fillmore's (1982) **frames** or Ronald Langacker's (1987) **experiential domains**. For instance, Langacker (1987:150) states that ICM corresponds to a large extent to what he calls an **abstract domain**. Another similarity, which has been signalled above, is that of Lakoff's (1987:80-82) **cluster model** and Langacker's (1987:147) **domain matrix**. In the present thesis both terms are seen as close, albeit not synonymous. They can be briefly described as follows:

[10] See Evans and Green (2006:296).

[11] See Ungerer and Schmid (1996:115).

[12] See Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1993), Kövecses (2002).

[13] See Croft (1993), Langacker (1987).

[14] See Radden and Kövecses (1999).

[15] See Kövecses (2002), Evans and Green (2006), Panther and Thornburg (2007).

1. **domains** are complex cognitive structures based on experience which organise our knowledge about the world;
2. **ICMs** are culture-based conceptual representations of these structures viewed in terms of their interconnected parts (submodels);
3. **submodels** of a cluster model may originate from various domains, but include only those elements of a domain which are relevant for the ICM they are part of, though they may indirectly provide access to other areas of knowledge;[16]

Thus, ICM – due to its characteristics – appears to be better suited to the description of stereotypes than experiential domain. On the other hand, the latter have a well established position in the study of metaphor and metonymy. Consequently, both terms are in use in the present thesis, though in slightly different contexts.

It is worthwhile at this juncture to discuss briefly the interpretation of ICMs (and related notions) pursued in the present thesis. In short, **experiential domains** are seen as complex cognitive structures (based largely on experience) which organise our knowledge about the world,[17] while **ICMs** are mainly culture-based conceptual representations of these structures viewed in terms of their interconnected parts,[18] that is submodels. The **submodels** of a cluster model, in turn, may originate from various domains, but include only those elements of a domain which are relevant for the ICM they are part of.[19] If an ICM is accessed through one of its submodels, we can speak of **metonymy**, which may be defined as a cognitive mechanism in which a **vehicle** is highlighted and provides mental access to the **target**, within the same ICM.[20] Metonymy, then, should be distinguished from **metaphor**, in which the two cognitive entities involved, that is, the **source domain** and the **target domain**, belong to different ICMs.[21]

[16] It should be noted that in principle there are no qualitative differences between *models* and *submodels* other than the fact that in a given context the latter happens to be part of the former (cf. the division into *domains* and *subdomains* in Ruiz de Mendoza (2000:115-120)).

[17] Cf. Langacker (1987), Cienki (2007).

[18] Cf. Kövecses (2002).

[19] See section 1.2.2.2.4.

[20] Cf. Langacker (1993), Croft (1993), Radden and Kövecses (1999), Barcelona (2003).

[21] Cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1993), Croft (1993), Radden and Kövecses (1999), Kövecses (2002).

To sum up, the merit of the cognitive approach to categorisation (and the theory of ICMs in particular) is that it can better account for the psychological findings on the working of the human mind. In particular, on the one hand, we tend to think about categories in terms of prototypical cases, rather than in terms of all of their members. In many real-life situations the strategy of ignoring non-prototypical cases is both cognitively efficient and economical, which is perhaps responsible for the appeal of the classical approach. On the other hand, we are flexible enough to deal with peripheral cases, by extending the category (through metaphor or metonymy), redefining it, or treating the problematic members as 'exceptions that prove the rule'. This can be seen very clearly in stereotypes.

Stereotypes, usually defined as simplified perceptions of other people, are those cognitive structures whose inaccuracy is generally known and accepted. Yet they do not differ in principle from other categories, or ICMs. To be more specific, both human and non-human categories are subject to the same cognitive principles, including idealisation (or simplification).[22] This does not mean, though, that there are no differences between them. First of all, humans are more complex and dynamic than most other entities, and – consequently – they defy complete description. Secondly – and perhaps more importantly – humans as targets of categorisation can communicate their emotions concerning the process itself. Thus, labels such as *macho, liberal, Muslim*, etc. activate elaborate cognitive models both in the conceptualiser and his or her target; models which are nevertheless idealised (that is, simplistic), and which the latter may not wish to be reduced to. In contrast, classifying a tomato as a *vegetable* will not provoke any comment on the part of the target.

In the context of intercultural relations the reductionism inherent in stereotypes takes the form of what is known in psychology as the **out-group homogeneity effect**, that is, the belief that *they are alike, we are diverse* (Myers 1993:400). Another factor which makes stereotypes, especially ethnic stereotypes, a controversial issue, is **axiology**. Specifically, as argued by psychologists working within the frameworks of **social identity theory** (Tajfel 1978, Tajfel and Turner 1979), and **self-categorisation theory** (Turner 1985, Turner *et al*. 1987), social categorisation is based on the principle of **ethnocentrism** (Sumner 1906, Herskovits 1973), which sets the in-group as a benchmark for comparing and evaluating other groups (that is, out-groups). In other words, apart from a cognitive function (present also in other types of ICMs), stereotypes perform a social function of maintaining in-group integrity

[22] Consequently, some linguists (see, for example, Putnam 1975, Bartmiński 1990, 2009, Tokarski 1990, Dąbrowska and Anusiewicz 2000) adopt a broad understanding of the notion of *stereotype*.

through the accentuation of inter-group differences. Importantly, **stereotypes of out-groups tend to be negatively loaded** and may degenerate into prejudice and discriminatory behaviour. This does not mean, of course, that stereotypes cannot be overcome. However, they are often deep-rooted and may be activated by the sheer act of categorisation. To conclude, the in-group bias implicit in stereotypes, combined with their inbuilt reductionism, often engenders strong emotions on the part of the target group.

The above-mentioned out-group homogeneity effect has a bearing on our perception of the phenomenon of ethnicity. In particular, as argued in section 2.3.1, it appears that **there are various levels of 'granularity' of the model of ETHNICITY**. The three major ones are the levels of CIVILIZATION (RACE) / WORLD REGION, NATIONALITY / COUNTRY and ETHNOGRAPHIC GROUP (ETHNIC MINORITY) / LOCALITY. The middle, generic level is **basic** in that it is here that intra-group similarities and inter-group differences can be most easily observed.[23] It is possible, however, to shift one's perspective by zooming in or out. In other words, our perception of the phenomenon in question (and possibly other phenomena) is subject to what may be tentatively called **conceptual zooming**.[24] For instance, a native of Barcelona may see himself or herself as a Catalonian, Spaniard, or a Southern European, depending on the situation or – more generally – on the extent that these categories contribute to his or her social identity (see Tajfel 1978).[25] On the whole, the perception of the in-group is more fine-grained than that of out-groups. Thus, most Americans would probably find it difficult to distinguish between Catalonians and the inhabitants of other regions of Spain, or even between Spaniards and other Southern Europeans (even if they are aware of the existence of the fine-grained categories).

Observe that the three levels of ETHNICITY presented above appear in pairs containing social and spatial categories. This reflects the fact that, although ETHNICITY refers to people, it is inextricably connected to the idea of homeland, which is one of its key elements (Hutchinson and Smith 1996b:6-7). Therefore, in the model of ETHNICITY pursued in the present thesis[26] the submodel of COUNTRY is seen as central, along with that of PERSON. For instance, the most basic definition of the ethnonym *Frenchman* would be 'someone who comes from France.' Yet the knowledge (beliefs) encapsulated in stereotypes reaches far beyond the statement that someone comes from a particular country. Since every human being

[23] Cf. Rosch *et al*. (1976).

[24] See section 2.3.1.

[25] Obviously, other categories, more fine- or coarse-grained, are at least in theory possible.

[26] See section 2.3.2.

eats food, wears some clothes, speaks some language, does something for a living, etc., we may postulate the existence of the submodels of CUISINE, CLOTHING, LANGUAGE and OCCUPATION, as well as BODY, CHARACTER, NAME, PARAGON, GEOGRAPHY, NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, SOCIAL STATUS, RELIGION, EMBLEM, INSTRUMENT, etc., which form the extended model of ETHNICITY.[27] Such a view of the concept of ETHNICITY is consistent with the encyclopaedic view of meaning, one of the basic tenets of Cognitive Linguistics (see Langacker 1987, Lakoff 1987). Importantly, once a particular extended submodel is activated, it provides access to the whole ICM. In other words, such a submodel serves as a **vehicle** through which the **target** (that is, the ETHNICITY ICM) can be accessed, which suggests **metonymy** as a typical cognitive mechanism involved in ethnic stereotypes. In sum, **an ethnic stereotype is** seen in the present thesis as **an ICM which consists of a cluster of metonymic models** (or submodels), some of which are central, with others being extended.[28]

While discussing ethnic stereotypes it is vital that we acknowledge the role of language. Specifically, as observed by Maass and Arcuri (1996), language introduces order into knowledge (or beliefs) about out-groups by providing labels which can serve as **evaluative reference points**. It also transmits stereotypes and helps maintain them. Finally, language can serve as a means of expressing one's stereotype-related identity. As argued in section 2.3.3, out-group labels which draw on extended submodels of the ETHNICITY ICM can be technically described as **attributive ethnonyms**, for they ascribe an attribute to a particular target out-group (see Kudła 2010). Attributive ethnonyms usually function as **dysphemisms**,[29] being employed with the intention of ridiculing or offending the target out-group. It may be assumed, then, that such terms belong primarily to the realm of **slang**, or *anti-language* (Halliday 1976), rather than standard language. It needs to be stressed, however, that even if their users' aim is merely to achieve a humorous effect (rather than to insult), attributive ethnonyms may be perceived as pejorative simply because they originate outside the target group and because they reduce it to one attribute, neglecting its diversity. Ultimately, it is the context that decides whether a particular term is a dysphemism or not.

It appears that **the use of attributive ethnonyms is a universal characteristic of human societies**, not limited by spatial or temporal criteria. This does not mean, however,

[27] It needs to be added here that the submodels of PERSON and COUNTRY are *central* in the sense put forward by Langacker (1987:159-161), that is, they are relatively more *conventional*, *generic*, *characteristic* and *intrinsic* than extended submodels. This is not the matter, then, of being *essential* or *additional*.

[28] See section 2.3.

[29] See Allan and Burridge (1991), Chamizo Dominguez (2005).

that they are equally distributed across time and space. The first step towards the emergence of attributive ethnonyms is the awareness of the existence of a particular out-group among the members of a particular in-group. The next step is the presence of a set of beliefs – that is, a stereotype – concerning the former. Finally, there has to be considerable motivation within the in-group to extend their lexicon through the introduction of attributive ethnonyms, besides the officially-accepted literal ones. **The choice of an attribute** is not random; rather, it **is determined by the (alleged) popularity of the attribute within the target out-group and by the degree of its exoticness in the in-group**. To give an example, while someone from France may be labelled in English as *frog-eater*, there are no terms such as **croissant-eater* or **wine-drinker*, which – it may be argued – describe the eating habits of the French equally well, or even better.

English is probably one of the languages best suited to a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of ethnic otherness, not only because of its rich lexicographic tradition (which gives a researcher an opportunity to trace a wide range of lexical items, including examples of more ephemeral nature), but also thanks to its native speakers' extensive contact with other cultures in the course of history. Therefore, the analytical sections of the present thesis have been devoted to an onomasiological investigation into English attributive ethnonyms, examples from other languages being used mainly as cross-reference. In particular, the first part of the analysis (section 2.3.3.4) consisted of a general overview of potential submodels of the ETHNICITY ICM, exemplified by attributive ethnonyms. The second part (section 2.4), in turn, consisted of a diachronic analysis of English **foodsemic ethnonyms**, that is attributive ethnonyms which draw on the concept of FOOD. As a matter of fact, foodsemic ethnonyms cover but a fragment of the phenomenon of **foodsemy**, that is the process of conceptualising humans and various forms of their activity in terms of foodstuffs, through metaphor or metonymy.[30]

The analysis of English attributive ethnonyms has enabled a number of observations to be formulated. In particular, the basic cognitive mechanism found in attributive ethnonyms is metonymy, though there are cases which also involve a metaphor, yielding metaphtonymy. The two most common metonymic vehicles are PERSON and ATTRIBUTE. The former is part of the pattern <**PERSON/AGENT/ATTRIBUTE POSSESSOR FOR ETHNIC GROUP**>,[31] and can be seen in *Taffy* 'Welshman', *laundryman* 'Chinese man', *spearchucker* 'black American', etc. The

[30] Cf. Kleparski (2008a), Cymbalista and Kleparski (2013).

[31] Which may be seen as a more specific instantiation of the <**STEREOTYPICAL MEMBER FOR CATEGORY**> metonymy (Kövecses and Radden 1998:53).

latter forms the metonymy <**ATTRIBUTE FOR ETHNIC GROUP**>,[32] in which the concept of PERSON appears to be omitted from the equation, as in *kangaroo* 'Australian', *redshank* 'Irish person', *blue-cap* 'Scottish person', etc.

In general, the analysis of English attributive ethnonyms has enabled the identification of the following extended submodels of the ETHNICITY ICM: BODY (e.g. *cottontop* 'Scandinavian'), CUISINE (e.g. *spaghetti* 'Italian'), LANGUAGE (e.g. *oui-oui* 'French person'), CLOTHING (e.g. *cloggie* 'Dutch person'), CHARACTER (e.g. *pinch-penny* 'Scottish person'), NAME (e.g. *Abdul* 'Arab'), PARAGON (e.g. *Hitlander* 'German'), GEOGRAPHY (e.g. *Northman* 'Norwegian'), NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (e.g. *Kiwi* 'New Zealander'), SOCIAL STATUS (e.g. *hick* 'Puerto Rican'), OCCUPATION (e.g. *cotton-picker* 'black American'), RELIGION (e.g. *dothead* 'Indian or Pakistani woman'), EMBLEM (e.g. *harp* 'Irish person'), and INSTRUMENT (e.g. *bow and arrow* 'Native American'). Apart from truly attributive ethnonyms, we might also postulate the existence of **quasi-attributive ethnonyms**, which are based on the central submodels, that is PERSON (e.g. *Dutch*, which – together with its Germanic cognates – is ultimately derived from P.I.E. root **teuta-* 'people') and COUNTRY (e.g. *Holland* 'the Netherlands').

Apparently, many attributive ethnonyms activate more than one submodel, as can be seen in *Ivan* 'Russian' (NAME and LANGUAGE), *camel jockey* 'Arab' (NATURAL ENVIRONMENT and OCCUPATION), and *halal* 'Pakistani immigrant in Britain' (RELIGION, CUISINE and LANGUAGE). In some cases, as in the former two, it is fairly easy to identify the **primary submodel** (NAME and NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, respectively), the others being **supplementary**. In other cases, however – for instance in *halal* – this task is much more challenging.

Another finding concerns the axiological status of attributive ethnonyms. In particular, it has been stated above that while such terms have 'dysphemistic inclinations', ultimately it is the **context** that decides whether a particular item is derogatory or not. Importanlty, the notion of context includes not only **situational**, but also **social** and **cultural** factors.[33] In general, the former are easier to change, yet their effects on a lexical item are usually transient. The latter two, in turn, are more difficult to overcome, but once this happens it can have a long-lasting influence on the perception of a particular term. On the whole, the default social and cultural

[32] Which may be seen as a more specific instantiation of the metonymy <**SALIENT PROPERTY FOR CATEGORY**> (Radden and Kövecses 1999:36).

[33] Cf. Chruszczewski (2011:216-228).

aspects of context for attributive ethnonyms would be that of pejoration, unless one (or more) of the following four conditions is met:

1. the term originates from or is negotiated with the target out-group (as in *Jew, Slav*, and most ethnonyms in sign languages);
2. the attribute is perceived by the target out-group as positive or neutral (as in *Norwegian*, or the ASL sign for 'Poland/Polish person');
3. the target out-group 'disarms the bomb' by accepting the term (as in *Kiwi, Yankee*);
4. the form of the term obscures its attributive origin (as in *Eskimo, Yankee*).

We may conclude, then, that the category of attributive ethnonyms displays prototype effects with respect to axiology. Specifically, the prototypical case is a term which is treated as a dysphemism both by the source group and the target group. However, there are also – admittedly, less prototypical – examples of terms which are treated as pejorative by the former group but not by the latter group, or the other way round,[34] as well as terms which are not treated as pejorative by either.

The above examples provoke a general comment concerning axiology. Namely, while discussing evaluative developments of meaning, be it ameliorative or pejorative, it is tempting to ascribe them to particular lexical items. However, a thorough analysis of the axiological load of a term should take context into account, since – as we have seen – the perspectives of the in-group and the target out-group frequently diverge. Thus, what is neutral for the former may be pejorative for the latter. What is more, it is often the case that only some of the item's senses (typically the figurative ones) undergo an evaluative change. For instance, the items *spaghetti, chilli* and *pretzel* may be seen as derogatory only when they refer to ethnic groups (Italians, Mexicans and Germans, respectively), not as names of foodstuffs.

The examples quoted in the previous paragraph lead us to the foodsemic context of ethnic otherness, richly represented in English. The most obvious interaction between the concepts of ETHNICITY and FOOD is that of culinary traditions. Indeed, out of 168 lexical items subject to diachronic onomasiological analysis, as many as 139 (82.7%) draw on the submodel of CUISINE. However, the remaining 29 items (17.3%) make no reference diet;

[34] Apart from *Eskimo*, there are cases of *dothead* 'Indian or Pakistani woman', *macaroni* 'Italian', *taco* 'attractive Mexican female', and many others, which are described by one of the lexicographic sources as 'intended as jocular, perceived as derogatory' (see *FAE*).

instead, they allude to the skin colour of various out-groups by focusing on the visual side of food. The two most common patterns in the former group are metonymies <**FOODSTUFF EATER FOR ETHNIC GROUP**> and <**FOODSTUFF FOR ETHNIC GROUP**> (40 and 38 items, respectively). Other, less common, patterns include metonymies which take as their vehicles, among others, the concepts of BODY PART (especially HEAD) and AGENT (be it general or specific). The former (23 items) may be viewed as co-activating the submodel of BODY, while some of the latter (around twelve items, depending on interpretation) apparently involve the co-activation of the submodel of OCCUPATION. Other supplementary submodels (the primary submodel being that of CUISINE) include SOCIAL STATUS (around 20 items, depending on interpretation), LANGUAGE (nine items) and RELIGION (eight items). Additionally, three items interact with the metaphor <**THE OBJECT OF SEXUAL DESIRE IS FOOD**>, while around ten items (depending on interpretation) may be classified as examples of a subtype of metaphtonymy, namely metaphor within metonymy (see Goossens 1990). In contrast, in the category of English non-dietary foodsemic ethnonyms, all items should be seen as instances of metaphtonymy, in this case metonymy within metaphor. Here the only submodel of the ETHNICITY ICM which is activated is that of BODY.

The analysis has shown that an overwhelming majority of English foodsemic ethnonyms come from the Mod.E. period; no examples from O.E. have been found, while M.E. witnessed only two marginal examples. The scarceness of data from these two periods may be to some extent caused by the scarceness of written records. It is beyond doubt, however, that it was the coming of Mod.E. that saw native speakers of English interact with other ethnic groups on a much larger scale than before. Thus, on the one hand the discovery of the 'New World' provided speakers of English with new contexts for inter-ethnic encounters (be it with natives or with European competitors). On the other hand, the importance of ethnic identity rose with the emergence of nation-states. In general, Am.E. contains more than 80% of the analysed items, compared to around 23% of the data found in Br.E.[35] The contribution of other varieties of English has been marginal. Needless to say, the earliest English foodsemic ethnonyms, which appeared in the sixteenth century and referred, among others, to the Welsh and Dutch, should be counted as Br.E. However, some of them were brought to America by English settlers and – as the example of *Yankee* shows – sometimes they would follow their own distinct paths of semantic development in Am.E. As a matter of fact, Am.E.

[35] Since a number of items can be found in more than one variety, the sum of these figures does not reflect the total number of the analysed items.

surpassed Br.E. in the number of foodsemic ethnonyms already in the early nineteenth century. Since then, the former variety witnessed a steady growth, reaching its peak of 73 items in the mid twentieth century and retaining this figure towards the end of that century. In the twenty-first century, however, the number of items decreased to 56, which is still a considerable figure. Interestingly, Br.E. has displayed a different trend. In particular, between the sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries the number of items rose from three to nineteen. In the following periods there was a slight decrease (to 16 items), followed by an increase (to 22 items) in the late twentieth century and another decrease (to 19 items) in the twenty-first century. The most commonly described ethnic groups are Mexicans (also Latin Americans in general, with 29 items, almost exclusively in Am.E.), black people (with 21 items, mainly in Am.E., all being non-dietary foodsemic ethnonyms), Germans (with 16 items, mainly in Am.E.), Jews (with 16 items, mainly in Am.E.), East Asians (mainly the Chinese, with 15 items, predominantly in Am.E.), Italians (also Southern Europeans in general, with 14 items, mainly in Am.E.) and the French (with 10 items, in Am.E., Br.E. and other varieties). Other ethnic groups include the Dutch, Welsh, Scottish, English/British, native inhabitants of the 'New World', South Asians, Arabs, Eastern Europeans, Scandinavians and Americans (a marginal case).

The analysis of temporal and spatial distribution of the data suggests four main interactional contexts which encourage the emergence of foodsemic ethnonyms, namely **neighbourhood**, **rivalry**, **war** and **immigration**. The former can be seen for instance in the existence of Br.E. terms for the Irish, Welsh and Scottish, as well as Am.E. terms for Native Americans and most non-dietary foodsemic ethnonyms, which refer to skin colour. The next two contexts are visible in Br.E. terms for the Dutch and French, as well as in an Am.E. term for Arabs and (to some extent) in Am.E. and Br.E. terms for Germans, respectively. Finally, the fourth context is exemplified by Am.E. terms for Mexicans (and Latin Americans in general), Italians (and Southern Europeans in general), Jews, Germans, East Asians, Scandinavians and Eastern Europeans, and by Br.E. terms for South Asians. As can be seen, the latter context appears to be the most prolific. Indeed, while in Br.E. the rise in the number of foodsemic ethnonyms across time has been small (albeit steady), Am.E. witnessed what can be described as an 'explosion' of such terms, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The times of the largest increase in the number of items referring to particular ethnic groups correspond roughly to waves of migration of these groups to the U.S.A. The question is whether these findings are true for all attributive ethnonyms, or whether they are characteristic of foodsemic ethnonyms only. Of course, this issue requires further study;

however, there are clues which suggest an answer. In particular, observe that contrary to such potential ethnic boundary markers as costume, anatomical features or names, the awareness of an out-group's culinary traditions requires a greater degree of familiarity, a degree offered by living next door (or next quarter) to members of the out-group. It is perhaps not an accident that Am.E., spoken in a country inhabited mostly by children and grandchildren of immigrants, a country which has been described as a *salad bowl*, has witnessed so many foodsemic ethnonyms in the course of history. The last puzzle to be solved is the decrease in the number of items in Am.E. and Br.E. in the early twenty-first century. This might to some extent be attributed to the fact that the period under discussion is in fact still open at the time of writing the present thesis. In other words, in a few years' time the figures might change. Yet there is another possible reason, namely the phenomenon of **political correctness**. In particular, in the twenty-first century Western civilisation has witnessed a growing social pressure towards the avoidance of insulting various groups of 'others', defined in terms of ETHNICITY, RELIGION, GENDER, etc. The future will show whether this trend can lead to the disappearance of foodsemic ethnonyms (and attributive ethnonyms in general).

To end with, it needs to be stated that there are a number of issues which remain unsolved. In particular, the major question is whether the tendencies concerning target groups, cognitive mechanisms, as well as spatial and temporal distribution of the English foodsemic ethnonyms described above, would be the same for other kinds of attributive ethnonyms. Other research problems are those addressed by the survey described above, namely the role of conceptual zooming in the perception of the concept of ETHNICITY, potential differences in the derogatory force of particular terms, the familiarity of native speakers of English with such terms, as well as the above-mentioned impact of political correctness. These are the possible directions of research which the author of the present thesis plans to pursue in the future.