UNIVERSITY OF RZESZÓW DOCTORAL SCHOOL



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Summary of the doctoral dissertation entitled: "Legal subjectivity of Artificial Intelligence. Civil law aspects"

This doctoral dissertation explores the proposal to recognize certain advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems as entities under civil law. This concept has emerged not only in legal doctrine but also in legislative initiatives, including those within the European Union. The dissertation is structured into seven chapters, concluding with a summary that presents the research findings and formulates conclusions *de lege lata* (according to current law) and *de lege ferenda* (proposals for future law).

The first chapter defines and describes the concept of artificial intelligence, serving as a foundation for subsequent discussions. It also outlines the history of AI development and details the characteristics and types of AI. This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive introduction to the topic under investigation.

The second chapter analyzes and compares the regulation of artificial intelligence across selected legal systems. This comparative study identifies the primary regulatory trends and the approaches taken by different legislators concerning the legal personality of AI. While the chapter examines general AI regulations, it primarily focuses on the legislative approaches to granting legal personality to AI systems.

The third chapter provides an overview of the concept of legal personality. It includes an analysis of the catalog of civil law entities throughout history. The current civil law entities and their legal statuses, particularly the scope of their legal capacities, are discussed. The chapter also explores the concepts of granting legal personality to other entities, such as rivers, lakes, or natural areas, which are not traditionally recognized as legal entities.

The fourth chapter proposes the conditions that an artificial intelligence system should meet to be recognized as a legal entity. It emphasizes that legal personality should be granted

only to the most advanced AI systems, characterized by a high level of autonomy and the ability to influence their operating environment.

From the perspective of the entire dissertation, Chapter Five is of key importance. It identifies the potential moments for the creation and termination of the legal capacity of artificial intelligence systems that meet the conditions outlined in Chapter Four. Additionally, Chapter Five discusses the possible scope of AI's legal capacity. This scope does not necessarily have to mirror that of natural persons or legal entities. The legal capacity of AI should at least encompass the following areas: ownership of movables and virtual goods, tort liability, contractual capacity and liability, capacity to be an author and inventor, and capacity to act as a proxy. Furthermore, it is noted that the legal capacity of AI could include administrative and legal capacity in relation to its activities.

Chapter Six addresses the issue of subjective rights for artificial intelligence systems that are granted legal personality. It argues that the creation of certain personal rights within such systems, particularly personal rights, is a natural consequence of acquiring legal personality. The chapter highlights the discrepancies between the potential legal status of AI as a legal entity and the legal status of other entities in terms of acquiring certain subjective rights. It also notes that granting legal personality to AI may necessitate the development of a new general clause, given the current framework of Article 5 of the Civil Code.

The final, seventh chapter analyzes the potential consequences of granting legal personality to artificial intelligence within the broader legal system. While it is impossible to predict all outcomes of such a decision, the chapter discusses the fundamental consequences inherently related to legal capacity, such as personal rights and judicial capacity. It also considers the basic implications, including the possibility of AI acting as a representative of other civil law entities, bearing civil liability, and having the capacity to be an author of a work or an inventor of an invention.

The summary of the dissertation consolidates the research conducted and presents *de lege lata* and *de lege ferenda* conclusions. The concept of granting legal personality to certain artificial intelligence systems would undoubtedly revolutionize the entire legal system, extending beyond civil law. However, this proposal requires thorough analysis, the results of which are detailed in this dissertation.